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Abstract: An increasing number of countries implement
Internet censorship at different scales and for a variety of
reasons. In particular, the link between the censored client
and entry point to the uncensored network is a frequent target
of censorship due to the ease with which a nation-state censor
can control it. A number of censorship resistance systems
have been developed thus far to help circumvent blocking on
this link, which we refer to as link circumvention systems
(LCs). The variety and profusion of attack vectors available
to a censor has led to an arms race, leading to a dramatic
speed of evolution of LCs. Despite their inherent complexity
and the breadth of work in this area, there is no systematic
way to evaluate link circumvention systems and compare
them against each other. In this paper, we (i) sketch an attack
model to comprehensively explore a censor’s capabilities,
(ii) present an abstract model of a LC, a system that helps a
censored client communicate with a server over the Internet
while resisting censorship, (iii) describe an evaluation stack
that underscores a layered approach to evaluate LCs, and (iv)
systemize and evaluate existing censorship resistance systems
that provide link circumvention. We highlight open challenges
in the evaluation and development of LCs and discuss possible
mitigations.
Content from this paper was published in Proceedings
on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PoPETS), Volume 2016,
Issue 4 (July 2016) as "SoK: Making Sense of Censorship
Resistance Systems" by Sheharbano Khattak, Tariq Elahi,
Laurent Simon, Colleen M. Swanson, Steven J. Murdoch and
Ian Goldberg. DOI: 10.1515/popets-2016-0028
1 Introduction
As the Internet becomes an increasingly important means to
engage in civil society, those who wish to control the flow of
information are turning to measures to suppress speech which
they consider undesirable. While blocking can take place at
*Corresponding Author: Sheharbano Khattak: University of Cam-
bridge, Sheharbano.Khattak@cl.cam.ac.uk
Laurent Simon: University of Cambridge,
Laurent.Simon@cl.cam.ac.uk
Steven J. Murdoch: University College London, s.murdoch@ucl.ac.uk
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year of Publication
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
#
 o
f 
P
lu
g
g
a
b
le
 T
ra
n
sp
o
rt
s
Fig. 1. Surveyed systems (literature and implementation) from the last
five years related to censorship resistance systems with a focus on link
circumvention.
a number of points on a network, the link between the cen-
sored client and entry point to uncensored part of the network
has been a frequent target as the censor is typically a power-
ful nation-state adversary in control of network infrastructure
within the censored region. A number of censorship resistance
systems have emerged to help bypass such blocks which we
call link circumvention systems or LCs (the scope of this sys-
temization is limited to systems that resist censorship on the
link). Due to the diversity of censorship mechanisms across
different jurisdictions and their evolution over time, there is
no one approach which is optimally efficient and resistant to
all censors. Consequently, an arms race has developed result-
ing in the evolution of LCs to have dramatically sped up with
resistance schemes becoming increasingly complex. This has
been captured in Figure 1 which shows work in this area over
the last five years as per our survey.
Despite the multitude of LCs that have been developed so
far, there is no systematic way to evaluate them. The area lacks
a comprehensive attack model of the censor which has led to
systems assuming arbitrary threat models, some of which are
misaligned with how real censors operate [1]. As a result of
the disparate attack vectors these systems protect against, it is
hard to assess the scope of circumvention offered by a system
in isolation as well as in comparison with others.
We systematize and evaluate existing work by conducting
a comprehensive survey of censorship resistance systems that
offer link circumvention (we identify 41 such systems). To un-
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derstand effectiveness of various LCs under different censor-
ship scenarios, we sketch a comprehensive attack model to un-
derstand a censor’s capabilities. Next we develop an abstract
model of a link circumvention system that enables a client ap-
plication in censored region to communicate with a server ap-
plication over the Internet, even though direct connections are
blocked.1 We then present an evaluation stack that highlights
capabilities of a LC in terms of the mechanisms employed to
resist different censorship vectors.
Related Work: Existing work systematizes censorship and
circumvention systems in a broader context. Elahi and Gold-
berg [3] present a taxonomy of censorship resistance strate-
gies for different types of censors (e.g. ISP, government) with
the decision-making process based on their resources, capa-
bilities, limitations and utility. Tschantz et al. [4] argue that
the evaluation of circumvention tools should be based on eco-
nomic models of censorship. Köpsell et al. [5] present a clas-
sification of blocking techniques based on the communica-
tion layer involved, the content of communication (e.g. im-
ages, web) and metadata of the communication (e.g. IP ad-
dresses of participants, time of the communication, proto-
cols involved). Perng et al. [6] classify circumvention systems
based on the technical primitives and principles they build
upon. Leberknight et al. [7] survey the social, political and
technical aspects that underpin censorship. They also propose
metrics that quantify their efficacy, i.e. scale, cost and granu-
larity. Our work has a special focus on the link circumvention
aspect of censorship resistance, and extends previous work by
using a comprehensive attack model and evaluation stack to
systematize link circumvention systems.
In this systemization of knowledge paper, we make the
following contributions:
– present an attack model from a censor’s perspective that
captures capabilities of a censor and the diversity of cen-
sorship mechanisms (Section 3).
– develop an abstract model of a link circumvention system
that facilitates communication between a censored client
and server in a censorship resistant fashion (Section 4).
– present an evaluation stack to assess scope of circumven-
tion offered by various link circumvention systems (Sec-
tion 4).
– survey 41 link circumvention systems and evaluate them
using the proposed attack model and evaluation stack. We
identify broad categories of resistance systems based on
1 An instance of our abstract link circumvention (LC) model is the de
facto API for anonymous communication systems to integrate with cen-
sorship resistance schemes [2], however, we purposely maintain a broad
focus to accommodate LCs that have not been written strictly as a Plug-
gable Transport but can fit the broad model with minor adaptation.
the attack path(s) that these seek to protect (Sections 5, 6
and 7).
– discuss open challenges in the evaluation of link circum-
vention schemes and discuss possible solutions to miti-
gate these (Section 8).
2 Background
In its simplest form, an information dissemination network
comprises an information consumer (the client), an informa-
tion publisher (the server) and a link that connects the two
(Figure 2a). A censor’s goal is to disrupt information dissemi-
nation. This can be done by directly targeting the information
(through corruption, insertion of false information, deletion or
modification), or by impairing access or publication of infor-
mation.
A censorship resistance system thwarts a censor’s at-
tempts to corrupt information, or its access or publication.
While a censorship resistance system can encompass any part
of the information network, in reality most systems offer cir-
cumvention on the link connecting information endpoints due
to its flashpoint status in the censorship arms race. Link cen-
sorship is more prevalent because it is less intrusive, and con-
venient (the communication infrastructure is typically under
the censor’s direct control).
For circumvention on the information link, it is common
to employ a proxy, an intermediate unblocked system that re-
lays traffic back and forth between the client and server. A
proxy divides the link between client and server into two dis-
tinct portions: (i) client to proxy (within censored region), and
(ii) proxy to server (outside censored region). This has been il-
lustrated in Figure 2b. Resistance systems increasingly treat
these two portions separately (via link circumvention mod-
ule and proxy module, respectively) as these lend themselves
to different design, implementation, and software distribution
practices.
The proxy module, being in uncensored region, may sim-
ply provide access to server, without offering any additional
security properties and could be simply implemented as a
HTTP or SOCKS proxy, or as a VPN. Alternatively, the proxy
module may be an anonymity system like Tor [8] which not
only provides access to the server but also prevents attack-
ers from being able to identify which user is accessing which
resource. In contrast, link circumvention being in the line of
fire is a rapidly evolving but less mature area. In this paper,
our focus is the link circumvention role of censorship resis-
tance systems. Any reference to censorship resistance systems
henceforth should be perceived within the scope of link cir-
cumvention.
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(a) A typical information retrieval process involves an information consumer (the client), an information publisher (the server), and a link that con-
nects the two. A censor’s goal is to disrupt dissemination of information either by corrupting it, or by hindering its access or publication (indicated by
red crosses in the figure).
(b) Circumvention software provides unfettered information retrieval despite censorship and may encompass any part of the information network. The
process is typically facilitated by a proxy that relays traffic between a client in the censored region and an external server, and effectively divides the
channel into two portions which circumvention tools handle separately via different modules: (i) client to proxy (link circumvention module), and (ii)
proxy to server (proxy module). The circumvention client allows the client application to construct a communication channel to the server application
through a circumvention server, which can optionally be facilitated by an intermediate device (circumvention facilitator).
Fig. 2. Information retrieval (a) without censorship, and (b) with censorship, aided by circumvention software.
3 A Censor’s Attack Model
To understand the scope of circumvention offered by various
tools, it is important to first understand the attack surface avail-
able to a censor (illustrated in Figure 3). While the link be-
tween client and server remains the focus of this paper, for
the sake of completeness, we also include client and server-
based censorship in the attack model. The model captures both
direct and indirect forms of censorship. While direct censor-
ship immediately targets information dissemination, indirect
censorship (or fingerprinting) provides input to aid the cen-
sor’s blocking decision. For example, a censor can identify
a protocol by destination port (fingerprinting) and follow up
by blocking IP addresses in the associated flows (direct cen-
sorship). For convenience, through the rest of this paper we
refer to shorthands associated with direct censorship and fin-
gerprinting activities described in Figure 3. We now discuss
various censorship scenarios grouped under direct censorship
and fingerprinting.
3.1 Direct Censorship
Censor on Client (CEN.CLI).
Client-side censorship can take place through direct or dis-
crete (facilitated by malware or insider attacks) installation of
surveillance software. This may lead to corruption of informa-
tion as well as access disruption. China’s Green Dam, a filter-
ing software product purported to prevent children from harm-
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Fig. 3. Censor’s attack model, showing both direct censorship (information corruption, or disabling access or publication) and indirect censorship
(fingerprinting to develop and improve features for direct censorship)
ful Internet content, was mandated to be installed on all new
Chinese computers in 2009 [9]. The software was found to be
far more intrusive than officially portrayed, blocking access to
a large blacklist of websites in diverse categories, and mon-
itored and disrupted operation of various programs if found
to be engaging in censored activity. TOM-Skype, a joint ven-
ture between a Chinese telephony company TOM Online and
Skype Limited, is a Voice-over-IP (VoIP) chat client program
that uses a list of keywords to censor chat messages in either
direction [10].
Censor on Server (CEN.SER).
A censor can install software on the server-side to corrupt the
information being published or disrupt the publication process.
A number of studies investigate Chinese government’s censor-
ship of posts on the national microblogging site Sina Weibo.
Bamman et al. [11] analyze three months of Weibo data and
find that 16% of politically-driven content is deleted. Zhu et
al. [12] note that Weibo’s user-generated content is mainly
removed during the hour following the post with ∼30% of
removals occurring within 30 minutes and ∼90% within 24
hours. Another study observes posts from politically active
Weibo users over 44 days and finds that censorship varies
across topics, with the highest deletion rate culminating at
82%. They further note the use of morphs–adapted variants of
words to avoid keyword-based censorship. Weiboscope [13],
a data collection, image aggregation and visualization tool,
makes censored Sina Weibo posts by a set of Chinese mi-
crobloggers publicly available.
Degrade Performance (DEG.PER).
Network performance degradation is a soft form of censorship
that diminishes access to information while at the same time
affording deniability to the censor. Anderson [14] uses a set
of diagnostics data (such as network congestion, packet loss,
latency) to study the use of throttling of Internet connectiv-
ity in Iran between January 2010 and 2013. He uncovers two
extended periods with a 77% and 69% decrease in download
throughput respectively; as well as eight to nine shorter peri-
ods. These often coincide with holidays, protest events, inter-
national political turmoils and important anniversaries, and are
sometimes corroborated by overt filtering of online services or
jamming of international broadcast television.
Block Routing Information (BLK.ROU).
Censorship can leverage items of a connection tuple (source
IP address, source port, destination IP address and destination
port) to disable information access or publication. The block
can continue for a short period of time to create a chilling ef-
fect and encourage self-censorship on part of the client. One
study notes that the Great Firewall of China (GFW) blocks
communication from a client IP address to a destination IP
address and port combination for 90 seconds after observing
‘objectionable’ activity over that flow [15]. The GFW has been
reported to drop packets originating from Tor bridges based on
both source IP address and source port to minimize collateral
damage [16].
Corrupt Routing Information (COR.ROU).
A censor can disrupt access by corrupting information that
supports correct routing of packets. This can be done by
changing routing entries on an intermediate censor-controlled
router, or by manipulating information that supports the rout-
ing process, e.g. BGP hijacking and DNS manipulation. The
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de facto protocol for
inter-AS routing. A censor can block a network’s connectiv-
ity to the Internet by withdrawing previously advertised net-
work prefixes or re-advertising them with different proper-
ties (rogue BGP route advertisements). A number of countries
have attempted to effect complete or partial Internet outages
in recent years by withdrawing their networks in the Inter-
net’s global routing table (Egypt [17], Libya [18], Sudan [19],
Myanmar [20]). DNS is another vital service that maps names
given to different Internet resources to IP addresses. The hi-
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erarchical distributed nature of DNS makes it vulnerable to
censorship. Typical forms of DNS manipulation involve redi-
recting DNS queries for blacklisted domain names to a censor-
controlled IP address (DNS redirection or poisoning), a non-
existent IP address (DNS blackholing) or by simply dropping
DNS responses for blacklisted domains. China’s injection of
forged DNS responses to queries for blocked domain names
is well known, and causes large scale collateral damage by
applying the same censorship policy to outside traffic that tra-
verses Chinese links [21].
Corrupt Flow Content (COR.CON).
A censor can compromise information or disrupt access by
corrupting flow content (COR.CON), i.e. the application layer
payload. For example, a censor can inject HTTP 404 Not
Found message in response to requests for censored content
and drop the original response, or modify the HTML page in
the body of an HTTP response.
Corrupt Protocol Semantics (COR.SEM).
A censor can corrupt information or disrupt access by manipu-
lating protocol semantics (COR.SEM). A censor can leverage
knowledge of protocol specification to induce disruption on a
flow (for example, injecting forged TCP reset packets into a
flow will cause both endpoints to tear down the connection).
3.2 Fingerprinting
Fingerprint Routing Information (FPR.ROU).
A flow can be associated with a protocol based on items of
the connection tuple. The destination port is a typical target
of censorship (e.g. 80 for HTTP). Flows addressed to IP ad-
dresses known to be associated with a blocked service can
be disrupted by implication. Flow fingerprinting of this kind
can form part of a multi-stage censorship policy, possibly fol-
lowed by a blocking step. Clayton examines the hybrid two-
stage censorship system CleanFeed deployed by British ISP,
BT. In the first stage, it redirects suspicious traffic (based on
destination IP and port) to an HTTP proxy. In the next stage it
performs content filtering on the redirected traffic and returns
an error message if requested content is in the Internet Watch
Foundation (IWF) list [22].
Fingerprint Content (FPR.CON).
Flows can be fingerprinted by checking for the presence of
protocol-specific strings, blacklisted keywords, domain names
and HTTP hosts etc. A number of deep packet inspection
(DPI) boxes can perform regex-based traffic classification [23–
26], however it remains unclear what are the true costs of per-
forming DPI at scale [27, 28]. Alternatively, flows can be fin-
gerprinted based on some property of the content being car-
ried. For example, a censor that does not allow encrypted con-
tent can block flows where content has high entropy [29].
Fingerprint Flow Properties (FPR.LEN and FPR.TIM).
A censor can fingerprint a protocol by creating its statisti-
cal model based on flow features such as packet length, and
timing-related features (inter-arrival times, burstiness etc.).
Once a model has been derived, a censor can fingerprint flows
based on their resemblance or deviation from this model [30,
31]. Wiley [32] used Bayesian models created from sample
traffic to fingerprint obfuscated protocols (Dust [33], SSL and
obfs-openssh [34]) based on flow features, and found that
across these protocols length and timing detectors achieved
accuracy of 16% and 89% respectively over entire packet
streams, while the entropy detector was 94% accurate using
only the first packet. A host’s transport layer behavior (e.g. the
number of outgoing connections) can be used for application
classification. Flow properties can also be used to fingerprint
the website a user is visiting even if the flow is encrypted [35–
38].
Fingerprint Protocol Semantics (FPR.SEM).
A censor can fingerprint flows based on protocol behaviour
triggered through different kinds of active manipulation, i.e.
by dropping, injecting, modifying and delaying packets. The
censor’s goal is to leverage knowledge of a protocol’s seman-
tic properties to elicit behaviour of a known protocol. Alter-
natively, a censor can perform several fingerprinting cycles to
elicit the information on which to base subsequent blocking
decision. In 2011, Wilde [39] investigated how China blocked
Tor bridges and found that unpublished Tor bridges are first
scanned and then blocked by the Great Firewall of China
(GFW). Wilde’s analysis showed that bridges were blocked in
the following fashion: (i) When a Tor client within China con-
nects to a Tor bridge or relay, GFW’s DPI box flags the flow
as a potential Tor flow, (ii) random Chinese IP addresses then
connect to the bridge and try to establish a Tor connection; if
it succeeds, the bridge IP/port combination is blocked.
4 Link Circumvention
We now turn our attention from a censor’s attack landscape
to censorship resistance systems. In Section 2, we mentioned
that the link between information client and server (On Link
in Figure 2b) is a frequent target of censorship and hence the
assumed threat model of most resistance systems. It is com-
mon for resistance systems to employ an intermediate proxy
that divides the link into two parts, (i) client to proxy (link cir-
cumvention) and (ii) proxy to server. The focus of this work is
link circumvention: we first present an abstract model of link
circumvention, followed by an evaluation stack that represents
functional components of link circumvention as a multi-layer
stack. The evaluation stack can be used as a common bench-
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mark to visualize capabilities of different link circumvention
systems.
4.1 Abstract Model of a Link
Circumvention System
We present an abstract model of a link circumvention system
(LC), which lends itself well to analysis through the attack
model outlined in Figure 3. The goal of a LC is to enable a
client application to communicate with a server application
over the Internet, even though direct connections are blocked
(Figure 2b). The LC-client exposes an API whereby the client
application can request that a communication channel to the
server application be opened. The LC-client then connects to
the LC-server over a blocking-resistant communication chan-
nel, and the LC-server connects to the server application. The
client application can then communicate with the LC-client as
if it is communicating directly with the server.
The communication channel provided by the LC-client
and server has similar properties to TCP. Data sent through
the channel will either be delivered to the other end without
corruption in the same order as it was sent, or an error will be
reported to the sender. It is the responsibility of the LC to route
communications between the LC-client and LC-server, avoid
blocking, and recover from any corruption of data (whether by
the censor or due to other network disruption).
The LC-client and LC-server may be able to communicate
directly over the Internet, in that any intermediate networks or
routers are not aware of the protocol the LC is using. However
in some cases there may be a LC-router which implements
part of the LC protocol so as to facilitate the blocking resistant
communication channel.
The LC communication channel does not offer authentic-
ity, so it is the responsibility of the client and server applica-
tions to confirm that data received on the channel originated
from the expected party and has not been corrupted in tran-
sit. However many practical LCs will provide some degree of
authenticity so as to meet the goal of blocking resistance.
Ideally the latency of the communication channel will not
be much higher than that of the direct communication chan-
nel, but in some cases a much higher latency is unavoidable in
which case a client application which is designed for a normal
TCP connection may malfunction.
This abstract model is implemented through the de-facto
Pluggable Transport standard [2]. This API specifies how
modules are invoked (i.e. as separate executable), how the
communication channel is implemented (i.e. as an extension to
the SOCKS protocol), how configuration and status informa-
tion is communicated between client/server applications and
Pluggable Transport client/server (i.e. through a combination
of environment variables, command-line parameters, and stan-
dard in/out/error descriptors). Although this specification was
written for the Tor anonymity system, it is also implemented
in the Lantern [40] and Psiphon [41] simple proxy CRSs.
4.2 Evaluation Stack
In order to defend against the multiple avenues of attacks avail-
able to a censor, a link circumvention system (LC) is typically
designed as a series of components, with each component de-
fending against one or more attacks, either by itself or in con-
junction with other components. In order to describe the ca-
pability of each LC, we map each of them to a generic set of
components shown in Figure 4, arranged in layers analogous
to a network protocol stack.
The primary flow of payload information is between ad-
jacent layers in the stack, with the client/server application at
the top and network at the bottom. However just as with real-
world network stacks, control information does not always ex-
actly follow this abstraction and may skip layers. Also not all
layers will be present in all LCs, as some exclude certain at-
tacks from their threat model.
Before data can be sent over the LC communication chan-
nel, a session must be established. The Session Initialisa-
tion (SI ) is responsible for the handshake between the LC-
client and LC-server. This may involve negotiating connection
parameters, performing authentication, and deriving session
keys.
On the same uppermost layer is the Encryption (ENC )
which takes application traffic data and encrypts it so as to look
random to an adversary. The key for performing the encryption
is provided by the SI layer.
Next is the Multiplexing (MUX ) layer, which allows
multiple application sessions to be multipexed over a single
LC channel, or a single application session to be split over
multiple LC channels. This layer is also responsible for error
detection and re-assembly, if the lower layers do not provide
this.
Then the Content Obfuscation (OBF ) formats the ‘ran-
dom’ data stream so as to mimic the content of a different pro-
tocol, e.g. HTTP or VoIP.
Next Timing Obfuscation and Length Obfuscation
(TIM-LEN ) hide the application’s timing and packet length
patterns. The layer may perform the obfuscation itself, or may
just compute the changes which are necessary and transmit
this as control data to other layers which actually delay and/or
pad payload data.
Finally Transport (TRN ) is responsible for taking the
transformed payload data and sending it to the other side of
the LC client/server pair.
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Fig. 4. The Abstract Stack and Evaluation Stacks for Flashproxy and Cirrepede.
We conduct a comprehensive survey of censorship resis-
tance systems that offer link circumvention (LC). We identify
41 such systems which we broadly classify as ones that resist
IP address/host blocking (Section 5), flow fingerprinting (Sec-
tion 6) and composite systems that combine the last two (Sec-
tion 7). We further classify these high-level categories where
relevant. For each category, we discuss one representative LC
in depth with respect to the LC evaluation stack (Figure 4) and
the attack model (Figure 3). To capture the breadth of systems
in a given category, we also provide a brief discussion of other
relevant systems (under the title Miscellaneous).
5 IP Address/Host Filtering
Resistance Systems
A censor can disrupt access to a service by blocking the
server’s IP address, or a key hop directly on path to the server
(corresponding to BLK.ROU in Figure 3). A number of tools
have emerged to resist IP address filtering which we further
classify based on the circumvention approach they take. Tech-
niques under censorship surface augmentation hide the censor-
ship target (e.g. IP address) among a crowd such that censoring
the target incurs larger collateral damage than if it is blocked
in isolation. In decoy routing, a cooperative hop between client
and server applies circumvention-friendly treatment to packets
containing a special steganographic mark.
5.1 Censorship Surface Augmentation
The accuracy of a censor’s blocking decision depends on a
number of factors, such as the blocking mechanism employed
and the quality of target set to block. In particular, the censor’s
policy must make consideration for the acceptable false posi-
tive rate as these have political and economic ramifications [4].
Mechanisms under this category obfuscate the censorship tar-
get in such a way that censoring it incurs large collateral dam-
age in terms of false positives.
5.1.1 Flashproxy
Simple proxies with long-lived IP addresses that circumvent
IP blocking by relaying traffic between a client and censored
server suffer from the problem of being enumerated and sub-
sequently blocked by a censor (FPR.ROU, COR.ROU and
BLK.ROU nodes in the attack diagram in Figure 3).
To protect against these attacks, Flashproxy introduces
two new entities, i.e. facilitators and flashproxies (Figure 4b,
left and right, respectively). A facilitator is a volunteer web-
site outside the censored region which may be blocked by the
censor, yet remains reachable through low-bandwidth chan-
nels such as email. Over this channel, the Session Initialisation
module (SI ) of a censored user registers itself by sending its
IP address and a port where it awaits incoming connections.
On the facilitator side, the SI adds a special badge in all the
web pages it serves to uncensored users, typically a piece of
Javascript. When an uncensored user visits a web page on the
facilitator website, the badge turns the visitor’s web browser
into a flashproxy. The SI of a flashproxy (running in the web
browser of an uncensored user) connects to the facilitator to
retrieve an IP-port pair for a censored user and initiates a con-
nection to it. The SI of the censored user accepts the con-
nection to complete the rendezvous between the two entities.
Thereafter, the Content Obfuscation (OBF ) of the flashproxy
relays censored content for the censored user through HTTP
(“HTTP framing” in Figure 4b).
Flashproxy offers resistance against IP address blocking
only, consequently leaving a number of paths on the attack di-
agram exposed. A censor could block traffic based on content
(COR.CON), use statistical traffic properties (FPR.LEN and
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FPR.TIM) to detect the protocol or content to block, or ob-
serve characteristic patterns in incoming connections to cen-
sored hosts (FPR.SEM). The authors suggest using Flashproxy
in combination with Tor to thwart COR.CON attacks.
5.1.2 Miscellaneous
VPN-Gate [42] is a public VPN service that randomizes the
IP addresses of its VPN servers through a pool of volunteer-
run VPN-Gate proxies. To prevent a censor from harvesting
all proxies, VPN-Gate (i) only gives a fraction of the entire
pool to each client, (ii) includes decoy IP addresses (belong-
ing to vitally important hosts on the Internet, such as Win-
dows Update servers) in the pool, and (iii) by aggregating data
across VPN-Gate proxies to flag probes from a censor. One
design trend is to use a widely used service as a proxy to fetch
censored content. Meek [43] employs a technique called do-
main fronting [44] to evade host-based censorship by using
an innocuous domain name (front domain) in the unencrypted
request header (TLS Server Name Indication header – SNI),
while hiding the domain of a proxy (inside-domain) in the en-
capsulated encrypted request (HTTP Host header). The front
domain (the only one visible to a censor) is an intermediate
web service hosting many domains (typically a CDN) which
decrypts the inside-domain and internally routes the traffic to
the relevant host within its network. This host serves as a proxy
for censored clients to access blocked servers. OSS [45] turns
any existing Online Scanning Service (OSS) (web services that
take a URL as user input and then fetch the web page behind
that URL e.g. PDFmyURL [46]) into a proxy to fetch censored
content. A variation of this scheme is for clients and servers
to rendezvous on an intermediate host, blocking which incurs
significant collateral damage. CloudTransport [47] clients and
bridges (i.e. proxies) share a common account on a cloud stor-
age which they use to share files containing client requests
and bridge responses in real time. Collage [48] peers exchange
data through social networking and photo sharing websites by
embedding hidden messages in user-generated content such as
posts and images. MIAB [49] improves Collage’s rendezvous
by leveraging blog pings, i.e. real-time notifications a blog
sends to a centralized network service (a ping server) when
content is updated. By monitoring ping servers, MIAB peers
automatically learn when a new message is available. Defi-
ance [50] allocates ephemeral IP addresses to its gateways and
bridges from a large pool of diverse IP addresses. The tran-
sience and diversity of IP addresses make it hard for a censor
to block or enumerate them. To access blocked websites, the
Defiance client must connect to a shorted-lived bridge which
acts as a proxy. To learn an ephemeral bridge location, a client
must successfully complete a dance; that is, make a sequence
of pre-agreed timed short-lived connections to ephemeral gate-
ways.
5.2 Decoy Routing
In this approach, clients covertly signal a cooperating inter-
mediate router to deflect their traffic meant for a non-blocked
destination (to evade the censor) to a blocked one. To de-
flect traffic, deflecting routers must be located on the forward
network path from the client to the non-blocked destination.
These routers must therefore be strategically positioned to op-
timise the number of censored users that can be served [51].
It is theoretically possible for a censor to defeat decoy routing
by routing traffic around the deflecting routers [52]. However,
in practice this is believed to be too costly for a censor be-
cause of business relationships with other ISPs, and monetary,
performance and quality of service degradation issues thereby
induced [53].
5.2.1 Cirripede
Cirripede offers resistance against IP address filtering
(BLK.ROU, FPR.ROU and COR.ROU in the attack diagram
in Figure 3). In addition to this, it also resists content-based
fingerprinting (FPR.CON) and content tampering/blocking
(COR.CON) through its authenticated encryption layer. Its
corresponding evaluation stack is presented in Figure 4c.
To use Cirrepede, a censored user must first register its
IP address and a shared secret with a Registration Server
(RS). The registration is facilitated by a friendly ISP that de-
ploys Deflecting Routers (DRs) that redirect non-registered
client traffic to the Registration Server. To register, the Session
Initialisation (SI ), Transport (TRN ) and Encryption (ENC )
module of a client coordinate to encode a covert registration
signal into the TCP Initial Sequence Number (ISN) of a series
of packets destined to a non-blocked destination. The registra-
tion packets are deflected by the Deflecting Routers (DRs) and
reach the Registration Server where they are inspected. If the
Registration Server successfully recognises the signal in the
packets, its SI instructs all Deflecting Routers within the ISP
network to deflect subsequent client traffic to a Service Proxy
(SP). After sending the registration packets, a client selects an
innocuous non-blocked destination and initiates a TLS hand-
shake to it which is taken over by the Service Proxy that acts
as a web proxy to censored content thereafter.
A censor could still attack unprotected nodes of the at-
tack diagram in Figure 3. Traffic from/to different websites
generally has different characteristic patterns, therefore a cen-
sor could determine that traffic feigned to originate from a
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non-blocked website actually comes from a blocked website
(FPR.LEN and FPR.TIM). It could also detect protocol imple-
mentation inconsistencies due to the non-blocked and blocked
destination running different software stacks (FPR.SEM).
5.2.2 Miscellaneous
Telex [54], TapDance [55] and Curveball [56, 57] can se-
lectively tag individual connections on-the-fly (in contrast to
Cirrepede that deflects client traffic after registration). Telex
and Curveball embed their tag in the random nonce of a TLS
handshake with a non-blocked destination. TapDance encodes
the tag in a connection’s incomplete HTTPS request to a de-
coy server using a novel steganography scheme. Cirrepede,
TapDance and Curveball support asymmetric flows where up-
stream and downstream traffic do not follow the same path be-
cause of ISP’s internal routing. TapDance is the only solution
that does not require active inline flow blocking to prevent fur-
ther decoy-server client communication. This property makes
it easier to be deployed by ISPs without disturbing existing
traffic and quality of service. IBS [58] improves decoy rout-
ing solutions in general by simplifying key distribution and
providing forward secrecy. These are achieved with the use
of identity-based encryption instead of traditional public-key
cryptography.
6 Flow Fingerprinting
Resistance Systems
These systems obfuscate blocked traffic such that it cannot be
fingerprinted by a censor, some by offering resistance against
fingerprinting of protocol semantics, while others mimic a
supposedly whitelisted category. Another approach to censor-
ship evasion is to transform flows leveraging a censor’s analy-
sis limitations (monitor-driven flow transformation).
6.1 Fingerprinting of Protocol Semantics
A number of schemes offer resistance against protocol scan-
ning, i.e. techniques used by a censor to confirm that a ma-
chine is indeed part of an anti-censorship system. Typically,
a censor probes for an open port and attempts to “speak”
the anti-censorship protocol. To defeat protocol scanning, a
SilentKnock [60] server accepts incoming connections on a
particular port only from clients that authenticate with a spe-
cial “knock” (a one-way authentication mechanism embedded
in TCP headers). BridgeSPA [61] (originally known as SPA-
Tor [62]) builds upon SilentKnock’s design but relaxes server-
side memory constraints associated with per-client housekeep-
ing. It replaces counters with rounded-to-the-minute UTC
timestamps and long-lived keys with short-lived ones. Defi-
ance [50] imposes several levels of address indirection to pre-
vent unauthenticated access to bridges from protocol scanning
censors. Keyspace-Hopping [63] discloses only a fraction of
its proxies to each client. It defeats protocol scanning probes
through the use of shared secrets. It forces a censor to dedi-
cate more resources to discover proxies by requesting clients
to solve computational problems.
6.2 Mimicry
Mimicry-based mechanisms transform traffic to look like
whitelisted communication, such that the transformed traffic
resembles the syntax or content of an allowed protocol or ran-
domness.
6.2.1 Mimic Existing Protocol or Content
A large body of work evades censorship by imitating an in-
nocuous protocol (e.g. HTTP) or content (e.g. HTML). Typ-
ically the mimicry is based on widely-deployed protocols or
popular content thus complicating a censor’s task by (i) in-
creasing the censor’s workload as there is more volume of traf-
fic to inspect, and (ii) increasing the collateral damage associ-
ated with wholesale protocol blocking.
StegoTorus.
StegoTorus obfuscates packet length and inter-packet timing
of Tor traffic thus thwarting fingerprinting of flow properties
(FPR.LEN and FPR.TIM nodes in the attack diagram in Fig-
ure 3). It also prevents content fingerprinting (FPR.CON) and
content tampering/blocking (COR.CON) with authenticated
encryption. Optionally it can mimic a set of innocuous proto-
cols over which covert traffic is sent. The corresponding eval-
uation stack is presented in Figure 5b.
StegoTorus comprises two modules, both of which can be
implemented by a combination of LC components. To start a
session, the SI of a client and server (i.e. proxy) first establish
a shared key through a key-exchange that only contains ran-
dom bytes: this thwarts content-based filtering (FPR.CON).
Once a session is established, the TIM-LEN module chops
fixed-length input packets into random-sized messages. Sizes
are taken from a trace of an innocuous protocol session pre-
recorded by the user or bundled with the software (FPR.LEN).
A 32-byte ID is added to messages so they can be re-ordered
by the recipient. The ENC module then encrypts messages in-
dividually (COR.CON and FPR.CON) and passes them again
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to the TIM-LEN module which adjusts their sending time
in accordance with packet inter-arrival times derived from a
pre-recorded traffic trace (FPR.TIM). Optionally, the Content
Obfuscation (OBF ) component of StegoTorus can mimic a
known protocol such as unencrypted HTTP. For example the
OBF of a client may embed the encrypted messages into the
HTTP Cookie header and url part of requests, and the OBF of
a server may reply by steganographically embedding content
into the body of HTTP responses.
StegoTorus uses long-lived server locations. So if a cen-
sor manages to harvest them, it could block them by injecting
TCP RST packets or erroneous DNS responses (COR.ROU,
BLK.ROU and FPR.ROU).
Miscellaneous.
FOE [64] and MailMyWeb [65] proxies send users static web
pages as email attachments in response to censored URLs they
receive in an email Subject field (assuming that SMTP is not
monitored or email traffic is encrypted). SWEET [66] creates
a bi-directional communication channel by encapsulating cen-
sored traffic into email attachments such as images. To prevent
a censor from blocking all emails sent to the proxy, each client
sends requests to a unique email address. SkypeMorph [67]
shapes inter-packet timing and packet size distribution so as
to mimic a Skype video call. TransTeg [68] negotiates an
overt codec during a VoIP call initialisation, but thereafter
encodes the raw voice stream with a different lower-bitrate
codec (the covert codec), thus reducing the length of packets to
transmit. The freed space is filled with low-bandwidth covert
traffic. FTE [69] extends conventional symmetric encryption
with the ability to specify the format of the ciphertext with a
regex. This thwarts protocol fingerprinting by transforming a
blocked source application-layer protocol into an unblocked
target application-layer protocol.
Protocol imitation has a number of limitations that make
it possible to distinguish imitated traffic from legitimate traf-
fic [70, 71]. To avoid the above pitfalls, a number of recent
mimicry-based circumvention systems reuse genuine software
and libraries and tunnel covert traffic through them. Facet [72]
streams potentially censored videos over video-conferencing
calls of popular applications such as Skype, Google Hangout
and FaceTime. Freewave [73] modulates traffic into acous-
tic signals and streams them directly into an existing VoIP
application such as Skype. JumpBox [74] feeds HTTP re-
quest directly into a web browser’s stack in order to ‘emu-
late’ the networking characteristics of the HTTP protocol. Cas-
tle [75] provides obfuscation for low-bandwidth application
(e.g. chat and emails) through real-time strategy (RTS) video
games. It encodes data as player actions in the game and uses
desktop-automation software to feed player actions directly to
the game’s user interface. Rook [76] leverages First Person
Shooter (FPS) video games to obfuscate chat sessions of users
within a censor region. It identifies packet fields of high en-
tropy and replaces them with other legitimate game values be-
fore they are sent. Marionette [77] mimics a protocol’s state-
ful semantics and statistical properties by composing proba-
bilistic state machine automata through flexible plugins and
domain-specific languages. Content obfuscation is achieved
through template grammars built using probabilistic context-
free grammars.
6.2.2 Mimic Unknown Protocol or Content
Another approach is to make traffic look like an unknown pro-
tocol, either by imitating randomness or arbitrarily deviating
from a known blocked protocol. This idea is motivated by the
general assumption that a censor implements blacklisting of
known protocols and is unwilling to incur high collateral dam-
age associated with whitelisting.
ScrambleSuit.
ScrambleSuit [78] obfuscates a censored protocol with
random-looking bytes for all its traffic including session ini-
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tialisation thus thwarting fingerprinting based on flow content
(FPR.CON in the attack diagram in Figure 3). Encryption of
content provides content obfuscation (FPR.CON), confiden-
tiality and resistance against tampering (COR.CON). Packet
lengths and inter-arrival times are also randomised (FPR.LEN
and FPR.TIM). ScrambleSuit uses a special protocol for ses-
sion bootstrapping that resists tampering (COR.CON) and
protocol scanning (FPR.SEM). The corresponding evaluation
stack is presented in Figure 5a.
To connect to a ScrambleSuit proxy, the SI of a client
redeems a short-lived ticket retrieved from a low-bandwidth
out-of-band channel. After the first authentication, the server
gives the client a ticket for the next connection. This ticket pro-
vides mutual authentication and therefore resistance against
protocol scanning from a censor (FPR.SEM). Furthermore, it
only contains random bytes to evade content-based detection
(FPR.CON). Once a session is initialised, the ENC component
turns all traffic into random-looking bytes, thereby thwarting
content-based fingerprinting and blocking (FPR.CON). It also
provides authentication and confidentiality (COR.CON). The
TIM-LEN component randomises packet lengths (FPR.LEN)
and timing of flows (FPR.TIM) using discrete probability dis-
tributions provided by the ENC module.
ScrambleSuit protects against most attacks in the attack
diagram (Figure 3). One limitation is that the IP addresses
of ScrambleSuit proxies are known, and therefore vulnera-
ble to being enumerated and subsequently blocked by a server
(COR.ROU and BLK.ROU).
Miscellaneous.
MSE [79] is the de-facto obfuscation mechanism used by Bit-
Torrent. Both the key exchange and traffic session contain only
random-looking bytes. Padding is added to all traffic including
the handshake. Dust [33] is a similar system with the capa-
bility to shape packet sizes based on an arbitrary distribution.
obfs2 [80] obfuscates traffic content with encryption, but the
key exchange does not provide authentication against passive
and active attackers. obfs3 [81], initially adopted by Scram-
bleSuit, improves obfs2 by negotiating keys using anonymous
Diffie Hellman (DH) with a special encoding so as to be indis-
tinguishable from a random string. This forces a censor to ac-
tively probe the server or perform a man-in-the-middle attack
to detect the key exchange. obfs4 [82] adds authentication to
obfs3 using the ntor handshake [83, 84] and is now used by
ScrambleSuit. Unlike ScrambleSuit, obfs2 and obfs3 do not
randomise packet lengths and inter-packet timings.
6.3 Monitor-driven Flow Transformation
(MDFT)
Systems under this category shape traffic in a way that ex-
ploits the limitations of an adversary’s traffic fingerprinting
model. Effectively, this mechanism can provide unobservabil-
ity to even cleartext traffic, which is particularly useful for
countries that prohibit encrypted traffic.
6.3.1 Khattak et al. [59]
This work explores protection against content-based filtering
(FPR.CON and COR.CON in the attack diagram in Figure 3)
by exploiting limitations of the implementation of Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) boxes. The evaluation stack is presented in
Figure 5d.
Being operationally similar to Network Intrusion Detec-
tion Systems (NIDS), DPI boxes grapple with the same issues
that make them vulnerable to evasion: when to create state for
a flow to monitor, when to tear down state for a flow being
monitored, how to interpret a packet stream in the presence
of multiple routing paths, divergent header fields, and overlap-
ping IP fragments and TCP segments. The authors intermingle
a number of specially crafted packets in their regular packet
stream to fetch Web content from a server outside China using
a client inside China, and highlight a number of vulnerabilities
in the Great Firewall of China (GFW)’s traffic analysis model.
For example, one observation was that by sending a TCP reset
packet with low TTL value for an existing connection, subse-
quent packets containing blacklisted keywords are no longer
censored.
Most nodes of the attack diagram (Figure 3) are not pro-
tected by this approach. Even without a clear view of the entire
stream, a censor could still block traffic on a per-packet basis,
for example by filtering packets destined to known server IP
addresses (FPR.ROU, COR.ROU and BLK.ROU) or by fin-
gerprinting packet length (FPR.LEN).
6.3.2 Miscellaneous
GoHop [85] breaks the notion of ‘flow’ used by Deep Packet
Inspection (DPI) boxes by sending traffic over a set of random-
ized ports. Clayton et al. [86] note that the GFW terminates
offending connections through injection of TCP reset packets.
A client can circumvent this form of censorship by ignoring
all the TCP reset packets it receives. West Chamber [87–89]
forces the GFW to purge state for a connection and exclude it
from censorship analysis by exchanging specially crafted TCP
reset packets between the client and server. These packets are
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ignored by TCP stacks of the client and server, but considered
by the GFW.
7 Composite Censorship
Resistance Systems
These systems offer resistance against filtering of both IP ad-
dresses and hosts (Section 5), and flow-based censorship (Sec-
tion 6).
7.1 CensorSpoofer
CensorSpoofer provides resistance against IP address har-
vesting (BLK.ROU, COR.ROU and FPR.ROU nodes in the
attack diagram in Figure 3) using spoofed source IP address,
and resistance against content-based blocking (FPR.CON and
COR.CON) by mimicking encrypted VoIP traffic. The evalua-
tion stack is presented in Figure 5c.
CensorSpoofer client sends requests for censored content
to a CensorSpoofer server (spoofer) over email, which then
serves blocked content to the client over a VoIP call. The SI
of a CensorSpoofer client creates four accounts: two email ac-
counts (one from a local provider and one from a foreign one),
and two VoIP accounts (one from a local registrar and one from
a foreign one). The local accounts serve as client agents, while
the foreign accounts act as server agents. A client registers
with the spoofer by sending a registration message containing
information related to its accounts and a shared cryptographic
key. The spoofer logs in to the foreign accounts (VoIP and
email) and monitors incoming messages from the client’s local
accounts. Once registered, the SI of a client initiates a session
by calling the spoofer’s VoIP account. The spoofer accepts the
call and provides a dummy IP address and port. The client
then sends dummy UDP traffic to the IP address provided by
the spoofer, while sending censored requests to the spoofer’s
email account. Upon receiving a request, spoofer serves the
blocked content in encrypted UDP traffic by spoofing source
IP address of the dummy host. The ENC module of Censor-
Spoofer prevents content-based censorship (FPR.CON) and
provides data confidentiality and authentication (COR.CON).
As CensorSpoofer does not shape traffic, a censor may be
able to detect discrepancies between a real voice call and the
web traffic sent over UDP (FPR.LEN and FPR.TIM in Fig-
ure 3). Furthermore, there may be an indicative correlation be-
tween the timing of a VoIP call and SMTP traffic (FPR.SEM).
7.2 Miscellaneous
Freewave [73] mimics VoIP traffic while also hiding proxy IP
addresses. It modulates traffic into acoustic signals and sends
them over a VoIP network such as Skype, Vonage or iCal. To
hide the IP address of a proxy, client traffic is relayed through
multiple VoIP peers. For Skype, this is achieved by configuring
the Freewave proxy as an ordinary node so that VoIP traffic is
routed via Skype super nodes. Infranet [90] thwarts IP block-
ing by turning a non-blocked cooperative website into a proxy.
Besides relaying censored content, proxy websites continue to
serve their usual uncensored content. For its upstream channel,
Infranet encodes covert traffic in sequences of HTTP requests;
for its downstream channel, it steganographically embeds con-
tent in uncensored images.
8 Discussion and Challenges
In Table 1, we provide a summary of link circumvention
systems (LCs). For each LC, we note components of the
evaluation stack (Section 4.2) that the system implements
to offer protection along various path(s) in the attack dia-
gram (Figure 3). We note that a large number of systems re-
sist content-based blocking and fingerprinting (FPR.CON and
COR.CON), with relatively less focus on routing-based cen-
sorship (BLK.ROU, COR.ROU and FPR.ROU). Only a few
systems protect against flow fingerprinting based on length and
timing (FPR.LEN and FPR.TIM), while none address attacks
related to manipulation of protocol semantics (COR.SEM).
The heavy emphasis of existing LCs on content-based circum-
vention is in contrast to how censors have historically imple-
mented blocking in practice, i.e. through blocking or corrup-
tion of routing information [1]. Furthermore, LCs tend to clus-
ter around specific evasion styles making them vulnerable to
unprotected paths in the attack diagram (Figure 3).
Our systemization highlights two main limitations in the
area of link circumvention, i.e. lack of (i) common evaluation
criteria, and (ii) modularity and flexibility. Currently each LC
uses its own evaluation criteria which makes it hard to assess
the scope of circumvention offered by a system in isolation as
well as in comparison with other systems. Testing and bench-
marking LCs is complicated due to the absence of a suitable
testbed, and involves separately downloading, compiling and
using systems with potentially different (and conflicting) build
and run environments. This has led to a situation where re-
search and development efforts are concentrated on proposing
new schemes instead of improvising existing systems. Related
to the testbed issue, there is no environment to simulate adver-
saries. Consequently, most adversarial assumptions are theo-
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Table 1. A summary of link circumvention systems. Columns represent a node of the attack diagram (Figure 3). Within each column, different sym-
bols denote components of evaluation stack (Figure 4) that a system implements to protect against the attack represented by the column. Symbols map
to the evaluation stack as follows: NSession Initialisation (SI ), ♠Encryption (ENC), ♣Multiplexing (MUX), Content Obfuscation (OBF), Timing
Obfuscation (TIM-LEN), HLength Obfuscation (TIM-LEN) andFTransport (TRN).
Section # Blocking Fingerprinting
COR.CON COR.SEM COR.ROU BLK.ROU FPR.LEN FPR.TIM FPR.SEM FPR.ROU FPR.CON
M
im
ic
ry
MSE 6.2 H N♠
FOE 6 N F F  F 
MailMyWeb 6 N F F  F 
Traffic Morphing 6.2 H
TransTeg 6 N♠ 
Dust 6.2 H N♠
SkypeMorph 6 N♠ F F F 
StegoTorus 6 N♠ H  ♣
obfs2 6 N♠
obfs3 6 N♠ N N♠
obfs4 7 N♠  H N♠ N♠
SWEET 6 N♠ F F F 
FTE 6 ♠ ♠
TRIST 6 
Rook 6 N♠ F F F NF
Castle 6 N♠ F F F  NF NF
Marionette 6 N♠ H   N♠
JumpBox 6 F F F
M
D
FT Khattak 6.3 F
GoHop 6.3 N♠ H N♠F
P
ro
t.
Fi
ng
pr
t. SilentKnock 6.1 NF
SPATor 6.1 NF
BridgeSPA 6.1 NF
Keyspace-Hopping 6.1 N♠
IP
Fi
lte
ri
ng
Cirrepede 5 N♠ N♠F N♠F N♠F N♠
Curveball 5 N♠ N♠F N♠F N♠F N♠
Telex 5 N♠ N♠F N♠F N♠F N♠
TapDance 5 N♠ N♠F N♠F N♠F N♠
Defiance 5 N♠ N♠ N♠
Flashproxy 5 NF NF NF N
OSS 5 N♠ N♠F N♠F N♠F 
MIAB 5 N♠ N N N N♠
IBS 5 N♠ N♠
Meek 5 N♠ N♠F N♠F N♠F N♠
CloudTransport 5 N♠ NF NF NF N♠
VPN-Gate 5 N♠ F F F N♠
C
om
po
si
te
Infranet 7 N♠ F F F 
Collage 7 N♠ F F F N♠
CensorSpoofer 7 N♠ NF NF NF N♠
Freewave 7 N♠ N N N N♠
ScrambleSuit 7 N♠ H  N♠ N♠
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retical and in some cases disconnected from how real censors
operate [1]. A number of systems protect against a censor ca-
pable of fingerprinting flow properties and content. Evaluation
of such systems will greatly benefit from a repository of traffic
capture files. Systems that perform traffic shaping use various
protocols in a ‘correct’ manner and require labelled datasets
against which to validate their schemes. Adversary Lab [91]
has done some preliminary work on developing a standard en-
vironment to evaluate systems resistant to flow fingerprinting
by subjecting them to a range of adversaries. Another impor-
tant but overlooked aspect of evaluation is performance and
usability. This is particularly important because LCs often rely
on help from volunteers for deployment who are naturally in-
terested in the system’s performance and maintenance costs.
We note lack of principled performance evaluation, with some
metrics being misaligned to a given use case. For example,
some systems use file download to approximate web brows-
ing performance. There has been preliminary work recently
on conducting user studies to evaluate LC’s performance [92].
The ability to quickly develop link circumvention systems
(LCs) for particular locations (spatial agility) and in response
to changes (temporal agility) is particularly important for cen-
sorship resistance because there is no one approach which
is optimally efficient and resistant to all attackers. However,
building a new LC is a significant undertaking, in particular
if it must include several classes of blocking-prevention tech-
niques (e.g. scanning-resistance, traffic-analysis resistance,
encryption) and robustness techniques (e.g. flow control, er-
ror detection and recovery). In many situations having several
schemes in operation is more effective than using any one [93]
(for example, Tor dealt with TLS handshake fingerprinting of
January and September 2011 by modifying its protocol to pro-
tect against the vulnerable attack path). Recently, there has
been a case for combining multiple LCs (particularly in the
context of Tor’s Pluggable Transports which are essentially
an instantiation of our abstract model of link circumvention
systems) with the goal to offer circumvention tailored to dif-
ferent censorship scenarios. So far, the sharing of Pluggable
Transport features has happened not in a black-box way, but
through the sharing of source code. LibFTE is in use by Tor
(in its fteproxy Pluggable Transport form) and a number of
other projects. Similarly, Meek which was originally devel-
oped for Tor now also exists in a fork by Psiphon [41] with
minor adaptations. Fog [94] uses multiple proxies to chain
Pluggable Transports in a black box fashion. This approach
is not suitable for practical deployment due to a number of
limitations. For example, not all combinations of Pluggable
Transports make sense: the chain obfs3 (flow fingerprinting
resistance) followed by Flashproxy (IP address filtering resis-
tance) offers more comprehensive resistance, but the reverse,
i.e. Flashproxy followed by obfs3 breaks the former’s network
layer assumptions.
The evaluation stack described in Section 4.2 was de-
signed to help understand and evaluate link circumvention
schemes (LCs), as well as assist the rapid development of new
schemes. We propose a framework to build link circumvention
schemes out of reusable components following the evaluation
stack architecture which we call Tweakable Transports (we are
currently writing the design specification [95]).
Tweakable Transports provide a modular and flexible plat-
form for writing link circumvention systems (LCs), while sim-
plifying evaluation. Following the evaluation stack, compo-
nents from a link obfuscation scheme can be extracted so that
each component complies with the abstract model the stack de-
fines. This approach assists the design process by providing a
set of patterns to follow, and a methodology for evaluating the
censorship resistance features which are offered. Just as ab-
stractions for components have been developed for compiler
design (lexer, parser, code generator) or GUI design (model,
view, controller), a systematic approach to design reduces de-
velopment time and improves quality of code. A particular in-
stance of a Tweakable stack may be designed by an expert
familiar with the properties of each component and a censor’s
blocking techniques and so allow the trade-off between per-
formance and censorship resistance. Alternatively instances
could be automatically generated and tested against the real
censorship system or a simulation of one, so as to quickly find
an adequate link circumvention scheme.
Tweakable Transports facilitate combining different link
circumvention (LC) features. Each component can be replaced
with another which is compatible and components can be in-
serted or removed. This approach allows code-reuse because
a component developed for one Tweakable Transport can be
used for another. In so doing, more collaboration opportu-
nities are allowed, better testing can be performed on fre-
quently required components improving reliability and both
spatial and temporal agility. As a result Tweakable Transports
exponentially increases the number of possible link obfusca-
tion scheme. The development effort to add one component
adds not just one new link obfuscation scheme, but creates a
whole new family of schemes, each one of which the censor
will need to test against any proposed fingerprinting or block-
ing technique. The increased development cost and possibility
of false-positives reduces the likelihood that a censor will be
able to effectively block the resulting LCs.
From the link obfuscation schemes summarised in this pa-
per, adapting their implementations to be Tweakable Trans-
ports allows weaknesses to be addressed. Missing layers (e.g.
resistance to timing and packet-length fingerprinting) leave
some schemes open to attack. Rather than developing a com-
ponent from scratch, a component can be imported from an-
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other link obfuscation scheme. New schemes can also be cre-
ated, such as combining the content obfuscation and tim-
ing/length obfuscation with a common session initialisation
and encryption component, via a multiplexing component.
One way to build link obfsucation scheme designs follow-
ing the principles of Tweakable Transports is to create an com-
mon API specification that allows components to communica-
tion [95]. This approach has the advantage of allowing existing
code to be re-used, which is particularly important when pro-
tocols to be impersonated are not specified and only available
as binary modules. However components need to be modified
to fit the API specification. An alternative approach taken to
creating Tweakable Transports is taken by Marionette where
the full link obfuscation scheme is written in a domain spe-
cific language (DSL) optimised for this case [77], reducing
flexibility but also reducing effort for cases when the DSL is
sufficient.
9 Conclusion
As censorship attempts have concentrated on disrupting the
link between a censored client and server, a multitude of cen-
sorship resistance schemes have been built to bypass such
blocks which we call link circumvention schemes (LCs). We
bring clarity to the complex and rapidly evolving field of link
circumvention by conducting a systematic survey of LCs in
terms of the threat-model defended against and their evalua-
tion in terms of an abstract evaluation stack. We have high-
lighted open challenges in the area of LCs with respect to
common evaluation criteria and modular/flexible development
of systems. These insights have motivated the case for a new
framework to efficiently compose LCs out of reusable compo-
nents following the evaluation stack presented in this paper.
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